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Firm size distortions under duopoly*1




Motivated by the fact that some regulations involve extra costs for those firms 
at a size beyond a critical threshold, this paper contributes to the analysis of 
the welfare distortions due to these regulations. In the context of a duopoly, our 
results show that social welfare is not monotonic with the regulatory threshold. In 
particular, we obtain the paradoxical result that a policy decision of increasing 
the threshold might involve a dramatic decrease in welfare in some markets. An 
interesting consequence of this result is that the positive discrimination towards 
small firms is a rather subtle issue. Our results suggest that the relevant regu-
latory thresholds should differ across industries. Apparently, this is taken into 
account in some countries (e.g., USA), but not in many other countries. 
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Resumen
Motivado por el hecho de que con frecuencia algunas regulaciones implican 
un coste extra para las empresas cuyo tamaño supera un cierto umbral, este 
trabajo analiza los efectos sobre el bienestar de estas regulaciones. En el 
contexto de un duopolio, nuestros resultados muestran que dichos efectos no 
son monótonos en el umbral regulatorio. En concreto, obtenemos el resultado 
paradójico de que la decisión regulatoria de elevar un poco el umbral puede 
generar reducciones abruptas del bienestar. Una consecuencia interesante de 
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este resultado es que la discriminación positiva hacia las empresas pequeñas 
es un asunto muy sutil. Los resultados sugieren que los umbrales regulatorios 
relevantes deben diferir entre sectores. Aparentemente, esto se tiene en cuenta 
en algunos países (como EE.UU.) pero no en muchos otros.
Palabras clave: Duopolio, bienestar, tamaño empresarial, efectos estratégicos.
Clasificación JEL: L11, L13, L52.
1. Introduction
Given that firms’ size distribution seems to be one of the main determinants 
of productivity, some recent literature has focused on the analysis of the direct 
effect of market regulations on the distribution of firms’ size. A substantial part 
of this literature has been based on the seminal paper by Lucas (1978) on the 
firm size and productivity distribution. In particular, García-Santana and Pijoan-
Mas (2014), Guner et al. (2006), and Guner et al. (2008) have evaluated the 
welfare effects of size-dependent policy regulations. More recently, Garicano 
et al. (2016) have investigated the impact of labour regulation in France, which 
involves an extra cost for the firms with more than 50 employees1. They find 
that the distortion in the distribution of firms’ size, associated with the pres-
ence of this critical threshold of a firm’s size, can explain approximately 0,6% 
of GDP. Those authors assume that each firm’s productivity is exogenous and 
determines its optimal size. Therefore, the social cost associated to the thresh-
old regulation of firm size arises because it prevents many firms from reaching 
their optimal size. Garcia-Santana and Ramos (2015) have contributed to the 
detailed empirical analysis of the economic relevance of this type of distortion 
using comparable data across 104 developing countries. 
We remark that Garicano et al. (2016), as well as the other mentioned 
contributors, analyze a general equilibrium model without strategic interaction 
between firms. Consequently, they only consider the direct effect of the threshold 
regulation. In contrast, the objective of our paper is to investigate the indirect 
strategic effects of such regulation. To this end, we consider a duopoly model 
where those strategic effects appear. Our results show that the social welfare 
is not monotonic with this threshold. In particular, we obtain the paradoxical 
result that a policy decision of increasing the threshold from intermediate-low 
levels to intermediate-high levels might involve a dramatic decrease in welfare. 
Therefore, our analysis shows that the strategic interactions, involved in concen-
trated oligopolistic markets, might yield counterintuitive policy implications. 
1 Other authors have focused on different relevant thresholds affecting firms’ size. In 
particular, Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez (2012) have pointed out the distortions associated 
with thresholds of receipts, from a tax avoidance perspective, in the case of Spain. There 
are also examples of threshold regulations related to gender issues. In particular, Chilean 
childcare regulation establishes, in its Article No. 203, that every firm with 20 or more 
female workers has to provide childcare facilities within firm premises. Therefore, Chilean 
regulation imposes, theoretically, an additional cost to firms after a certain number of 
female workers. We are grateful to a referee for pointing out this interesting example.
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In particular, the welfare level might change in a non-monotonic way when we 
move from more to less restrictive regulations. 
Therefore, our analysis notes that a positive discrimination towards small 
firms is a rather subtle issue. As a consequence, our results suggest that the 
relevant regulatory thresholds should differ across industries. Apparently, this 
is taken into account in some countries but not in many other countries. In 
particular, the US Small Business Administration (2009) establishes a very 
detailed methodology which defines the different size standards at the 6-digit 
NAICS (North American Industry Classification System) level. Therefore, the 
USA size standards, which are established for public subsidy purposes, rely on 
very specific industry definitions. However, the USA regulatory sensitivity to 
the particular features of each industry contrasts with the general threshold pre-
vailing in most European countries. In this article, we have considered a simple 
model to illustrate the impact of this type of positive discrimination towards 
small firms in a framework of strategic interaction. In particular, the existence 
of multiple equilibria and the non-monotonic relationship between the critical 
threshold and welfare can be associated, in our model, with a perverse firm 
incentive to remain small. In other words, there might be a type of Peter Pan 
Syndrome2 which is socially harmful. Therefore, one important insight of our 
analysis is that the impact of any policy intending to favor small firms (like the 
establishment of critical regulatory thresholds) should be analyzed in a separate 
way for each industry. 
2. The Model 
We will assume a duopoly Cournot model where two firms compete in 
the market of a homogeneous good with inverse demand function p = a – X/T, 
where T is interpreted as market size, p is the price of the good, and X is the 
total demand. Each firm has to pay a fixed cost Fi and a constant marginal cost 
c. Hence, the cost function of firm i is given by C(xi) = Fi + cxi, where xi is the 
production of firm i. Without loss of generality, we assume, for simplicity, that 
c = 0. Moreover, we assume Fi = 0 if xi ≤ z, and Fi = e > 0 if xi ≥ z,where e is the 
extra cost associated with having a size greater than the threshold z. In the rest 
of the paper, this threshold will be interpreted as the regulatory critical firm’s 
size such that beyond this level, the firm has to pay an extra cost e.
Formally, the profit function of firm i (where i=1,2 ) is given by
(1) Πi (xi ,x j ) = xi (a −
xi + x j
T
)−C(xi ),  where  C(xi ) =
0  if  xi ≤ z





2 This expression was first used, with this meaning, in the article entitled “The Peter Pan 
Syndrome”, The Economist (May 17, 2014). This article contains an interview of Manuel 
Milano of the Mexican Competitiveness Institute. 
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3. Equilibrium Analysis
In the absence of regulatory restrictions (that is, e = 0, or z = ∞) firm i ‘s 




= 0→ xi (x j ) ≡
aT − x j
2
.
However, if e is sufficiently large and z is sufficiently small, then we might 
have corner solutions in each firm’s optimal decision, which affects the shape 
of the reaction functions.
To investigate this issue, let us define the following critical values of xj:
First, x j
H  is defined by 
(3) xi (x j
H ) = z→ aT − x j
H
2
= z→ x jH ≡ aT − 2z.
Second, x j
B  is defined by 
(4)
Πi (xi (x jB),x jB) =Πi (z,x jB)→ T
















B ≡ aT − 2z − 2 εT .
Therefore, x j
H  is the critical xj such that above x j
H , the optimal firm i’s 
output is lower than z. Similarly, x j
B  is the critical xj, such that below x j
B  the 
optimal firm i’s output is larger than z (which implies the payment of the extra 
cost e). Because x j
B < x j
H , there is an intermediate interval of xj, satisfying 
x j
B < x j < x j
H , such that the optimal firm i’s output is a corner solution given by 
the threshold z. This corner solution is the result of analyzing firm i’s decision 
at the margin, when making the decision whether to go beyond the threshold. 
In particular, expression (4) provides the critical xj such that firm i is indifferent 
about producing the interior solution xi(xj) or the corner solution given by z. 
Note that, in the absence of the extra cost e, for these intermediate levels of its 
rival’s output, firm i’s best-response would involve an output level above the 
threshold z. In conclusion, the firm i’s reaction function is given by 
(5) Ri (x j ) =
xi (x j ) ≡
aT − x j
2
  if x j < x j
B
         z       if x j
B ≤ x j ≤ x jH
xi (x j ) ≡
aT − x j
2
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which is illustrated in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1
CASE 1, UNIQUE EQUILIBRIUM IS E1
In the following analysis, we will show that, depending on the parameters, 
there might be three main types of equilibria:
a) A symmetric equilibrium where the regulations do not affect firms’ decisions 
and both firms produce the same output level. In some cases, both firms 
produce over the critical threshold z and in some other cases both produce 
below this critical level. 
b) An asymmetric equilibrium where one of the firms produces the threshold z 
(a corner solution), while the other produces beyond z. Obviously, the ex-ante 
symmetry implies that, in this case, we have two equilibria: one with firm 1 
restricted to the threshold z and another one with firm 2 restricted to z.
c) A symmetric equilibrium where both firms produce the threshold output.
Moreover, we will show that for some parameters’ values, we have the 
symmetric equilibrium mentioned in (a) as well as the asymmetric equilibria 
mentioned in (b). 
By combining the reaction functions of both firms and taking into account the 
rest of the parameters, we will show that there are 5 cases regarding equilibrium 
outcomes, depending on the regulatory threshold z: 




εT , there is a unique 
symmetric equilibrium given by
(6) xi
* = x j
* = xN ≡ aT / 3 > z,   X* = 2
3
aT ,  p* = a / 3,   Πi* =Π j* =
a2
9
T − ε .
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This case is illustrated in Figure 1. Note that the following condition must hold:
(7)










which confirms that this case is satisfied for very small values of z.
FIGURE 2
CASE 2, THREE EQUILIBRIA
II) For intermediate-low levels of z, defined by zI < z < zII ≡ aT
3
− εT ,  there 
are 3 equilibria, illustrated in Figure 2. One of these equilibria is similar to 
the one calculated in case (I): both firms produce the same output which is 
greater than z. At each of the other two equilibria, one of the firms’ best reply 
to the threshold output by the other firm is to produce above that threshold. 
In particular, if firm i is the one that chooses the threshold output then the 
associated asymmetric equilibrium is given by
(8) xi
** = z,  x j
** = x j (z) ≡
aT − z
2
;  X**(z) = aT + z
2
.
According to Figure 2, the following condition must be satisfied in this case:
(9) z < xN ≡ aT / 3 < x jB ≡ aT − 2z − 2 εT < x j (z) ≡
aT − z
2
↔ zI < z < zII ,
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εT , and zII ≡ aT
3
− εT .
Note that zI < zII, which implies that there is a non-empty interval of inter-
mediate-low levels of z associated with this case. 




εT ,  
only the two asymmetric equilibria remain. This is illustrated in Figure 3. At 
each of the two asymmetric equilibria, one of the firms chooses the critical 
threshold in order to avoid the extra cost, and the other one takes advanta-
ge of this restrictive behaviour of its rival to expand its output. Note that, 
compared with the equilibrium in the case of no regulations, the asymmetric 
equilibrium associated with the regulation implies that the overall output 
decreases.
According to Figure 4, the following condition must be satisfied in this case:
(11) z < x j
B ≡ aT − 2z − 2 εT < xN ≡ aT / 3 < x j (z) ≡
aT − z
2
↔ zII < z < zIII ,
(12) where  zII ≡ aT
3





Note, that zII < zIII, which ensures a non-empty interval of intermediate-central 
values of z consistent with this case.
FIGURE 3
CASE 3, TWO EQUILIBRIA
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IV) For intermediate-high z, defined by zIII < z <   xN ≡ aT
3
,  the unique Nash 




*** = z, X***(z) = 2z
This case is illustrated in Figure 4 and implies the following condition:
(14) x j
B ≡ aT − 2z − 2 εT < z < xN ≡ aT / 3 < x j (z) ≡
aT − z
2
↔ zIII < z < xN .




, and  xN ≡ aT
3
.
Given that zIII < xN, it turns out that there is a non-empty interval of interme-
diate-high levels of z corresponding to this case. 
FIGURE 4
CASE 4, ONE EQUILIBRIUM
V) For very high levels of z, defined by z > xN ≡ aT
3
,  this threshold is so large 
that it becomes irrelevant. In this case, the equilibrium quantities are the 
same as in case (I), but now profits will be greater because the firms do not 
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pay the extra fixed cost. This case is illustrated in Figure 5 and is associated 
with the following condition:
(15) z > xN ≡ aT
3
.
Therefore, a very high level of z is the necessary and sufficient condition 
for this case to hold.
FIGURE 5
CASE 5, ONE EQUILIBRIUM
Figure 6 illustrates the comparative statics of the previous cases, focusing on 
the interplay between the critical threshold z and the equilibrium levels of total 
output X. In this figure, each of the regions labelled from (I) to (V) corresponds, 
respectively, to each of the cases from (I) to (V), previously explained. Recall 
that there are three types of equilibria in our model:
a) The symmetric equilibrium with both firms producing above z, which appears 
in regions (I), (II), and (V) and involves a total output given by X* = 2
3
aT .  
b) The asymmetric equilibrium with one firm producing z and the other one 
producing above z, which appears in regions (II) and (III) and is associated 
with total equilibrium output X**(z) ≡ aT + z
2
.
c) The symmetric equilibrium with both firms producing z, which is associated 
with the total equilibrium output X***(z) ≡ 2z.
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FIGURE 6 
TOTAL OUTPUT AS A FUNCTION OF THRESHOLD Z
The previous analysis can be summarized in the following result:
Proposition 1: As the critical threshold z increases, the following properties 
hold regarding the equilibrium quantities:
i)  For very low z (z < zI), there is a unique symmetric equilibrium where both 
firms produce above z (Region I in Figure 6).
ii)  For intermediate-low z (zI < z < zII), besides the previous symmetric equili-
brium, two new asymmetric equilibria appear. In each of those asymmetric 
equilibria, one firm produces above z, and the other one produces below z 
(Region II in Figure 6).
iii)  For intermediate-central z (zII < z < zIII), only the two asymmetric equilibria 
exist (Region III in Figure 6).
iv) For intermediate-high z (zIII < z < xN), at the unique symmetric equilibrium 
both firms produce the critical threshold z (Region IV in Figure 6).
v) For high z (z > xN), at the unique symmetric equilibrium both firms produce 
below the critical threshold z (Region V in Figure 6).
4. Welfare Analysis
Let us investigate the welfare associated with each of the cases previously 
considered. Total welfare is obtained by adding the consumer surplus and firms’ 
profits, which yields:
(16) W = pX + (a − p)X / 2− nUε = aX − X 2 / 2− nUε ,
where nU is defined as the number of firms for which the output is greater than 
the threshold z. Therefore, e is interpreted as a social cost (e.g., a red tape cost). 
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Nevertheless, as it is shown in the Appendix, our basic results holds if e is re-
interpreted as a tax transfer from the firm to the government (See Appendix).
Let us define Wr (z) as the welfare level in each of the previous cases, where 
r = I, II, III, IV, V. Easy calculations yield:3
 
















(19) W III (z) = 3a
2T 2 + 2aTz − z2
8T
− ε ,
(20) W IV (z) = 2z(a − z / T ),








The comparative statics about welfare is illustrated in Figure 7, which focuses 
on the relationship between welfare and the threshold output z. Again, the regions 
from (I) to (V) correspond to the previously explained cases from (I) to (V).
FIGURE 7 
TOTAL WELFARE AS A FUNCTION OF THRESHOLD Z
3 The first of the two values of WII (z) corresponds to the asymmetric equilibrium with 
one firm producing z, while the second value corresponds to the symmetric equilibrium 
similar to case I.
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The following remarks are in order:
i) It is easy to see that welfare is constant at the two extreme cases (Regions I 
and V in Figure 7) and it is greater in case (V). Therefore, when the critical 
threshold is either very small (z < ZI) or very large (z > xN), small changes 
to this regulatory variable do not have welfare effects.
ii) If, as a result of increasing z, there is a transition from Region I to Region II, 
then there might be a discontinuous fall in welfare. To see this, as illustrated 
in Figures 6 and 7, there are two types of equilibria in Region II. In addition 
to the symmetric equilibrium (similar to the one in Region I in which both 
firms produce above z) there are two asymmetric equilibria with lower 
production and welfare than at the symmetric equilibrium. By choosing the 
value of WII (z) corresponding to the asymmetric equilibrium (see footnote 3), 
we have 







− 2ε − 2z(a − z / T ),





(23) W I (zI )−W I (zI ) = 1
9
(30ε +8a εT ) > 0.
 Therefore, if the transition from Region I to Region II involves a shift from 
the symmetric equilibrium to the asymmetric equilibrium, then as a result 
of this small increase in z, the total welfare falls.
iii) For intermediate-high levels of z (Region IV in Figure 7), any increase in z 
increases welfare, which reaches its maximum level once z becomes irrelevant. 
In this case, relaxing the regulation on the threshold is welfare-enhancing 
because each firm’s output is determined by the threshold.
iv) The transition from case (III) to case (IV) involves a discontinuity:
(24) W III (aT − 2 εT ) / 3)−W IV ((aT − 2 εT ) / 3) = 2a εT − ε
6
> 0.
From the previous inequality, it follows that a small increase in z that shifts 
the equilibrium from case (III) to case (IV) implies a discontinuous fall in the 
level of welfare.
According to remarks (ii) and (iv), one interesting conclusion arising from 
our analysis is that the total welfare is not monotonic with respect to the critical 
threshold regulation. This conclusion can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 2: The following properties hold regarding the relationship between 
the threshold regulation, z, and welfare:
i) A moderate increase in z from small to intermediate levels might decrease 
welfare by shifting the market from a symmetric equilibrium to an asymmetric 
equilibrium.
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ii) For intermediate levels of z, a small increase in the threshold might decrease 
welfare by shifting the equilibrium from an asymmetric equilibrium to a 
symmetric equilibrium.
To see the intuition of part (i) of Proposition 2 note, first, that increasing 
the regulatory level of z enhances a firm’s incentives to expand its output at the 
expense of its competitor. However, the net effect on welfare is negative because 
the competitor’s best response is to remain small at z in order to avoid the extra 
cost. Note that this effect works when we depart from relatively small levels of 
z. This is because the expanding firm’s incentive to increase its output relies on 
the small size of its competitor. Therefore, one consequence of this part of the 
results is that if we depart from relatively restrictive regulation rules (given by 
small z), then a moderate increase in the level of flexibility might have perverse 
welfare results.
In the case of part (ii) of Proposition 2, the increase in z decreases the welfare 
as well. However the explanation for the decrease is very different. For intermedi-
ate levels of flexibility in the degree of regulation (intermediate z), relaxing this 
regulation reduces output because the (previously) large firm decides to reduce 
its production to z. This yields a symmetric corner equilibrium. Intuitively, once 
z is beyond some intermediate critical level, the residual demand for the large 
firm is too small to justify producing beyond this threshold.
Related with our previous insights, one interesting aspect of our model is 
that the degree of concentration in the market is not monotonic with the regula-
tory threshold: according to part (i), relaxing the regulatory threshold from low 
values tends to increase the degree of concentration, but, according to part (ii), 
the same policy tends to reduce the degree of concentration for greater levels of 
regulation. In other words, in the first case, the perverse effect of relaxing the 
regulation is associated with an increase in the level of concentration, while in 
the second case it is due to the reduction in the degree of concentration. 
Therefore, an important policy implication of our previous results is that 
regulation changes in the threshold on firms’ size might have welfare con-
sequences which are not monotonic with respect to this regulatory variable. 
Conversely, as the regulations generating size distortions are usually the same 
for all industries (they are associated with threshold levels for employment or 
revenues), their effects might be very different across industries. Nevertheless, 
as noticed in the introduction, there are some countries, like the USA, where 
the design of regulatory thresholds are industry-sensitive and account for the 
differential evolution of each industry. 
Interestingly, our analysis is connected with some previous literature dealing 
with the social convenience of helping minor firms. In particular, Lahiri and Ono 
(1988) noted that, even in the case of constant returns to scale, a more competi-
tive market (with extra number of firms) might imply a lower level of welfare. 
In our model, the idea of “helping minor firms” can be interpreted as a policy 
implying an increase in the critical threshold below which firms do not have to 
pay the extra cost. To see this, note that in the asymmetric equilibrium arising 
in our model, this policy “helps” the minor firm (which is the one that produces 
the threshold output) to produce more output. However, according to Proposition 
2(ii), this might involve a fall in the welfare level. This effect resembles the one 
noted by Lahiri and Ono (1988). However there are two important differences: 
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first, contrary to these authors’ model, consumer surplus decreases in our model 
because total production decreases. Second, our result holds even if both firms 
are symmetric ex-ante, while in the case of Lahiri and Ono (1988), the minor 
firm is more inefficient (it has higher marginal costs).
5. Conclusions and final comments
One important policy implication of our results is that changes in the regulatory 
thresholds of firms’ size might have counterintuitive, drastic, and non-monotonic 
welfare effects. This conclusion contrasts with most of the previous literature 
dealing with the welfare effects of this type of regulations. In particular, it 
seems that this previous literature has been mainly based on general equilib-
rium models that neglect the important strategic effects that usually appear in 
relevant oligopolistic markets. Therefore, our contribution notes that taking into 
account these strategic effects might have crucial implications for the welfare 
consequences of moderate changes in regulations affecting firms’ size decisions.
We remark that our results have been obtained under rather simplified condi-
tions e.g., the number of firms, the linear form of demand, and constant marginal 
costs. However, the main results can be easily extended. In particular, the coun-
terintuitive idea that relatively small changes in the regulatory framework might 
have drastic welfare effects is very likely to hold under more general oligopoly 
models. In fact, the discontinuity in the strategic responses by oligopolistic firms 
is a usual aspect of concentrated industries. Therefore, it seems that, despite of 
its simplicity, our model provides some basic insights regarding the effects of 
firm-size dependent regulations. 
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Appendix
In this appendix, we extend the welfare analysis in Section III to the case in 
which the fixed cost e is interpreted as a tax (conditional to firm’s output being 
greater than the threshold z). In this case, e is a transfer from the firm to the 
government, and the welfare is given by
W = pX + (a − p)X / 2 = aX − X 2 / 2,  (A.1) 
which is a reformulation of expression (16) under the new interpretation of e. 
Because (A.1) is strictly increasing in X, for the relevant values of this variable, 
the qualitative properties of X , as a function of z, are the same as those of W.
Easy computations show the following properties:





− z) < 0↔ z < aT
3
,
b) X**(z)− X***(z) = 1
2
(aT − 2z) > 0↔ z < aT
2
,
In particular, property (a) holds for zI and zII because zI < zII < aT
3
.  Similarly, 
property (b) holds for zIII because zIII <
aT
2
.  Those properties are reflected in
 
Figure 6. Therefore, if the fixed cost e is reinterpreted as a transfer from the 
firm to the government, then the welfare conclusions are very similar to those 
in the main text. To see this, note the following:
i) The welfare might fall as z shifts from Region I to Region II (from small to 
intermediate-low levels of z) and when z shifts from Region II to Region III 
(from intermediate-low to intermediate-central levels of z). 
ii) The welfare might also fall as z shifts from Region III to Region IV (from 
intermediate-high to very high levels of z).
Note that those conclusions resemble those obtained in Proposition 2.
